Wykaz publikacji wybranego autora

Piotr Faliszewski, prof. dr hab. inż.

profesor zwyczajny

Wydział Informatyki
WI-ii, Instytut Informatyki

  • 2018

    [dyscyplina 1] dziedzina nauk ścisłych i przyrodniczych / informatyka

[poprzednia klasyfikacja] obszar nauk technicznych / dziedzina nauk technicznych / informatyka

Identyfikatory Autora Informacje o Autorze w systemach zewnętrznych

ORCID: 0000-0002-0332-4364 orcid iD

ResearcherID: brak

Scopus: 14044821700

PBN: 5e70922b878c28a047391119

OPI Nauka Polska

System Informacyjny AGH (SkOs)

1
  • A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
2
  • A framework for approval-based budgeting methods
3
  • A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the robustness of (real-world) election winners
4
  • Achieving fully proportional representation by clustering voters
5
  • Achieving fully proportional representation in easy in practice
6
  • Algorithms for Destructive Shift Bribery
7
  • Algorithms for swap and shift bribery in structured elections
8
  • An analysis of approval-based committee rules for 2D-Euclidean elections
9
  • An experimental comparison of multiwinner voting rules on approval elections
10
  • An experimental view on committees providing justified representation
11
  • An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
12
  • Approximation algorithms for BalancedCC multiwinner rules
13
  • Approximation algorithms for campaign management
14
  • Approximation and hardness of Shift-Bribery
15
  • Between proportionality and diversity: balancing district sizes under the Chamberlin-Courant rule
16
  • Boolean combinations of weighted voting games
17
  • Bribery as a measure of candidate success: complexity results for approval-based multiwinner rules
18
  • Bribery can get harder in structured multiwinner approval election
19
  • Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
20
  • Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
21
  • Clone structures in voters' preferences
22
  • Cloning in elections
23
  • Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
24
  • Combinatorial voter control in elections
25
  • Committee scoring rules: a call to arms